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When the U.S. Military Implemented AI, Civilian Deaths Rose

This story is published in collaboration with Airwars.

On a balmy night in 2019, 35-year-old Barakat was on his way home, driven by friends through the ancient, mountainous Syrian village of Barisha, one among the previously abandoned Byzantine “Dead Cities.”

“I was with my best friends. They wanted to drop me off at home,” the father of five later told NPR. Barakat and his two companions had finished their day’s work as agricultural laborers at an olive press. “We had pumpkin seeds and bought coffee on the road and were having fun.”

Unknown to them, a fateful military operation was occurring nearby. Three hundred meters away, a team of U.S. special forces was raiding the compound of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

As the attack unfolded, most U.S. surveillance and reconnaissance assets were trained on the compound itself. Yet, known to few at the time, a new set of artificial eyes had been introduced to U.S. warfare in Iraq and Syria. Computer vision target detection, part of the Pentagon’s algorithmic warfare program known as Project Maven, enabled the military to recognize enemy personnel and vehicles through AI-assisted fusion and analysis of images and video.

As Barakat’s vehicle headed south through Barisha, Maven’s AI detected a vehicle that the U.S. military’s human eyes had missed. The ground commander then proceeded to call in the attack.

“At that moment, the helicopters arrived. Suddenly, we were hit. I didn’t know what was going on. I was just trying to escape death,” Barakat told NPR. His right arm was blown off, with his left hand partially disabled. His friends, Khaled Mustafa Qurmo and Khaled Abdel Majid Qurmo, were killed.

The U.S. military ultimately rejected Barakat’s claim of harm. The results of a second Pentagon review, opened after an NPR investigation, were never released.


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A spate of articles have hailed this as the year of AI warfare — from Ukrainian drones to Israel’s algorithmic decision support systems. A recent project that I worked on tracked how the rapid and potentially dangerous introduction of AI is transforming every part of the “kill chain.” 

The AI-powered attack on Barakat may have occurred seven years ago, but new research has shown that many of these systems had been fielded years earlier than previously known, prompting questions about the extent of artificial intelligence’s role in historical attacks — and how it has already impacted civilian harm.

People look at a destroyed houses near the village of Barisha, in Idlib province, Syria, Sunday, Oct. 27, 2019, after an operation by the U.S. military which targeted Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the shadowy leader of the Islamic State group. President Donald Trump says Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is dead after a U.S. military operation in Syria targeted the Islamic State group leader. (AP Photo/Ghaith Alsayed)
Children pass destroyed houses near the Syrian village of Barisha on Oct. 27, 2019, after an operation by the U.S. military targeting Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State group. Photo: Ghaith Alsayed/AP

Maven’s Dawn

The role of Maven in the 2019 Baghdadi attack was only revealed this year in journalist Katrina Manson’s book “Project Maven,” which charts the development of U.S. algorithmic warfare through the program of the same name. 

Project Maven sought to create the algorithms and platforms to fuse real-time data from multiple feeds — among them drones, radar, satellites, and text — to conduct detect threats, run pattern-of-life analysis, and track targets, in the service of accelerating military targeting.


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The U.S. military initially tapped Google as a technology partner for Project Maven. But Google pulled out in 2018, following protests about its involvement in AI targeting, and Palantir stepped in.

Maven’s most revolutionary aspects were twofold: the creation of a “single visualization tool” — in this case, Palantir’s Maven Smart System — to house the feeds, fuse them and turbocharge decision-making, better known as “decision support systems.”

The second transformative aspect was the training of AI algorithms on vast amounts of images and full motion video generated from drone surveillance and other aerial and space-based sensors — a collaborative effort involving multiple defense contractors, initially led by the Pentagon. Maven algorithms would then be deployed into conflict theaters and applied to data streams to detect objects or targets, in technology known as “computer vision.”

Since their introduction to the Iraq and Syria conflicts in December 2017, as reported by Manson, just how many of the U.S. strikes undertaken were aided by Project Maven algorithms remains classified. But some analysis is possible. 

December 2017 also saw the introduction of Maven AI to Somalia, at Baledogle Airfield where U.S. special forces were stationed, according to Manson’s reporting. At that point, the U.S. had run a covert campaign of special force raids, kidnappings, and drone strikes in Somalia for over a decade, targeting insurgent groups opposed to its allies — most prominently al-Shabab.

The initial aim wasn’t accuracy. Instead, the goal was to get analysts used to having their jobs made easier by the tireless, unblinking stare of computer vision.

Maven’s AI models were first trained on thousands of hours of drone footage from the country. Its integration lead, Colin Carroll, told Manson that Somalia was “more of a free-for-all” than other higher-profile American conflicts at the time, such as Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. Manson writes that “the operational risks of messing up weren’t as high,” and that Maven’s detection mistakes were “how crews got better.”

The initial aim wasn’t accuracy: Maven’s algorithms got its detections wrong more often than not, as Manson reported. Instead, the goal was to get analysts used to having their jobs made easier by the tireless, unblinking stare of computer vision. And it was a major step to the ultimate prize of getting the broader military hooked on AI — a goal that U.S. military planners appear to have met.

Earlier this year, the U.S. deputy secretary of defense wrote to Pentagon leaders to announce that Palantir’s Maven Smart System would be made a program of record, locking in use of the technology across the U.S. military. 

The Pentagon remains tight-lipped about AI’s role in given strikes, save for occasional authorized leaks or disclosures to select journalists. Therefore establishing the role of AI in civilian harm in a large enough sample of cases to draw significant conclusions is nigh impossible.

But data from the civilian harm watchdog Airwars — which has tracked alleged U.S. strikes in Somalia since 2007 — gives some understanding of what happened after computer vision was integrated into U.S. targeting.

In the two years up to the introduction of Maven in December 2017, Airwars documented 64 strikes attributed to U.S. forces in Somalia. In the two years after, that number rose to 153.


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This unsurprisingly coincided with a spike in civilians being harmed. In the 64 strikes in 2016 and 2017, Airwars documented a minimum of 25 civilians killed and a further eight injured. In the two years after the introduction of Maven, the civilian kill count rose to a minimum of 79 — a more than threefold increase.

There were other factors that contributed toward these trends. Shortly before Maven was fielded in 2017, President Donald Trump designated part of the country as an “area of active hostilities.” Previously, any U.S. strike in Somalia required near certainty that the intended target was present and civilians would not be harmed, but these rules were loosened. The Trump administration also reordered the military structure, making it easier for strikes to be signed off lower down the chain of command. At the same time, private contractors came to be used more extensively.

But this dramatic increase in strikes is consistent with the goals of Project Maven — which include finding more targets, and accelerating the targeting cycle.

There is no evidence that the introduction of AI reduced harm or made targeting more accurate.

At the very least, there is no evidence, as advocates claim, that the introduction of AI reduced harm or made targeting more accurate. In the two years before Maven’s introduction to Somalia, civilians were reported killed or injured in roughly 1 in 7 alleged U.S. strikes. In the two years after, that rose to more than 1 in 5.

In striking similarity to Barakat’s case, less than a year after Maven’s deployment in Somalia, on August 2, 2018, U.S. Africa Command struck and killed four individuals it claimed were “terrorists” in a vehicle. Amnesty International found that three civilians had been killed, prompting the command to declassify its assessment in a disclosure to The Intercept — revealing the military didn’t know the identities of those killed.

“Critical Juncture”

This week could mark a decisive moment for the use of artificial intelligence in war. At the United Nations conference on Certain Conventional Weapons, nations will decide on adopting a mandate to begin negotiations on a new treaty to regulate autonomous weapons.

“We are at a critical juncture,” said Nicole van Rooijen, executive director of the group Stop Killer Robots, a campaign group. “The vast majority of states worldwide are in favor of a new legally binding instrument on autonomous weapons systems.”

“The first and important step in setting norms for the limits of AI-enabled, accelerated use of force is the mandate to negotiate legally binding rules for autonomous weapon systems,” said Elke Schwarz, a professor of political theory at Queen Mary University of London.

Target identification AI models, such as Maven, would not be covered by current negotiations since the U.N. definition of autonomous weapons demands that a single system both autonomously select and strike a target.

“There is a whole separate [UN] process for AI in the military domain,” van Rooijen said, “and [for that] we are nowhere near a treaty process.”


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What played out in Somalia in the years after Maven’s introduction — a surge in the number of strikes and associated civilian harm — is similar to trends tracked in other recent military confrontations by actors known to use AI-powered systems.

The joint U.S.–Israeli attack on Iran ushered in a new era of AI-powered warfare. In the initial 40-day assault, the U.S. and Israel declared they struck more than 17,000 targets — a pace of warfare unparalleled in modern conflict. Airwars found that on every single day, Iranian civilians were reported killed or injured, in a total of 264 tracked civilian harm incidents.

In Somalia, the current Trump administration has already launched nearly four times the number of airstrikes than that of the Biden administration in its entire period in office, with reports of grave consequences for civilians. Last November, a U.S. airstrike reportedly killed at least 12 civilians, including eight children. No investigation appears to have been launched into the attack and, when asked by The Guardian, U.S. officials declined to provide its casualty assessment of the incident.

How machine-learning algorithms have contributed to targeting errors is compounded by misleading statements by militaries using AI.

One such case was U.S. Central Command’s response to a March 2026 investigation by Airwars and The Independent into the first known victim of an airstrike in which the use of AI-assisted targeting was acknowledged. The military command claimed that it had “no way of knowing” whether the strike in Iraq had relied on machine-learning algorithms, despite its chief technology officer initially claiming that it had.

Next Chapter in AI Warfare

Meanwhile, another, quieter development is underway that seems poised to further transform AI-powered warfare. Initiated by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the U.S. military is planning to embrace more complex versions of already-fraught computer vision models.

The “first generation” of models applied AI object detection algorithms to images and video feeds. However, in the “next chapter,” the NGA and private contractors have been training models to spot anomalies, thus detecting not just known threats but also potential ones.

As the NGA director explained last year, it could be an adversary truck that’s out of place, or a weapons manufacturing facility that has become very busy or fallen quiet. 

“Anomaly detection,” as it is known, takes computer vision one step further, by deciphering objects or targets from imagery and then applying machine reasoning to a scene to determine whether changes indicate potential threatening activity. 

But computer vision-based targeting models have been plagued by inaccuracy, and therefore risks of civilian harm.

When deployed in new terrain, and where uncertain environmental conditions hinder its abilities to recognize and flag objects, the first generation of Maven models exhibited a detection accuracy below 30 percent, according to Manson’s book. At times it was less than 10 percent.


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Treaty process aside, the distinction between autonomous weapons — narrowly defined — and AI-powered target identification may be one without a meaningful difference. In 2024, a Maven military exercise aimed at achieving 1,000 targeting decisions in an hour, which translates per operator as a decision to select or dismiss a target every 72 seconds.

When decision support systems serve targeting intelligence to military analysts at such intensity, the human in the loop becomes meaningless, argues Schwarz, the political theory professor.

“The use of AI target identification systems in recent conflicts in the Middle East has accelerated targeting to the point where no human decision-maker in the loop can make a truly meaningful decision, thereby becoming the proverbial cog-in-the-(killing)-machine,” she said. 

“In creating an illusion of human judgment, AI-enabled targeting systems are perhaps an even more problematic technology than fully autonomous ones.”

In response to questions from Airwars and The Intercept, a Palantir spokesperson said Maven’s “superior technology is critical to both deterrence, the avoidance of wars, and the protection of civilians in the case of war.”

“Thanks to [Maven Smart System],” the spokesperson continued, “the U.S. military is now better able to protect the American people from those that seek to harm us, and is better prepared, if necessary, to win wars in a responsible, precise, and technologically-dominant manner.”

Source: The Intercept · 2026-11-18