Tag: Cisco

  • AI-powered infostealer picks out the most profitable parts of your stolen data

    A new Windows infostealer sends the data it steals to an AI model and asks it to rank the victim’s assets by how much money they could bring in, Cisco Talos has found. “There is a new idea in the cybercrime world — cast a wide net, steal everything, and let AI sort out the specifics,” said Ryan Fetterman, a security researcher at Cisco. The malware calls itself VOLTA-AUTODOXER and turned up through Talos’ CAIRN … More →

    Source: Help Net Security · 2026-11-02

  • Fake IT help desk callers got by on little more than names and email addresses

    Attackers posing as IT help desk staff contacted employees by phone, email and Microsoft Teams in the third quarter of 2026 and talked them into opening remote access sessions, Cisco Talos Incident Response (Talos IR) found across several engagements. In one case, that access ended in ransomware. They knew names and email addresses “The attackers appeared to know employee names and email addresses, as they contacted users directly by email and Teams and used identities … More →

    Source: Help Net Security · 2026-10-30

  • CVE-2026-76418: Cisco Secure Firewall ASA Software and Cisco Secure FTD Software Unchecked Return Value to NULL Pointer Dereference Vulnerability

    Cisco Secure Firewall ASA Software and Cisco Secure FTD Software contains an unchecked return value to NULL pointer dereference vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause the device to reload unexpectedly, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition.

    • Vendor / product: Cisco Secure Firewall ASA Software and Cisco Secure FTD Software
    • Required action: Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset’s internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.
    • Federal due date: 2026-11-01
    • Known ransomware campaign use: Unknown
    • CWE: CWE-690

    https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-tunnel-dos-s6mgkb75 ; ; BOD 26-04: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk ; Forensics Triage Requirements: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk ; https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76418

    Source: CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities · 2026-10-29

  • Researchers uncover Volt Typhoon’s covert, ephemeral network

    Volt Typhoon, a China-government backed hacking group that has infiltrated America’s critical infrastructure networks for years, has consistently built and dismantled ephemeral malicious infrastructure to burrow into hundreds of sensitive systems undetected, Lumen Technologies’ Black Lotus Labs said in a Wednesday report.

    The covert access operation that researchers call “Silent Train” isn’t a standalone network, but rather a series of compromised small office home office (SOHO) routers, internet of things (IoT) devices and enterprise infrastructure that Volt Typhoon has rapidly rotated through since late 2023. 

    The Chinese threat group has used this chain of short-lived compromised infrastructure to exploit additional vulnerabilities, including zero-days, in network edge devices and gain deeper, persistent access into victim networks, researchers said. 

    “Individual chains are assembled and dismantled every day, with infrastructure continually refreshed,” Michael Horka, principal information security engineer at Black Lotus Labs, told CyberScoop. “Volt Typhoon demonstrated a repeatable capability to rebuild a new chain with different infrastructure in less than two minutes, making the number of nodes at any one moment effectively close to zero.”

    Black Lotus Labs has notified hundreds of victims since it first identified Silent Train activity, including telecom providers, government entities, defense contractors, communication services, universities and IT firms. Other victims spanning critical infrastructure include organizations in the water, energy, transportation, maritime, rail, aviation and emergency services sectors.

    “The ephemeral nature of the framework means our observations should not be interpreted as a complete census of Volt Typhoon activity,” said Horka, who also was the lead researcher on the report.

    The nation-state group’s investment in operational security and preserving access is remarkable, according to Black Lotus Labs.

    “We observed infrastructure assembled in under two minutes, sessions averaging roughly four hours, extensive cleanup, compartmentalization and continued development of new access vectors,” Horka said. “That is considerable effort devoted not even to get into their end targets, but purely to making important operations difficult to discover and trace.”

    Volt Typhoon relied more heavily on Silent Train after the FBI and Justice Department disrupted the KV Botnet in early 2024, researchers said. Earlier this year, U.S. and global authorities warned about a widespread shift in Chinese hacking groups’ use of covert networks riding on compromised common devices.

    The reach of those efforts is extensive and ongoing. Volt Typhoon has exploited and abused more than 27 device classes in Silent Train operations, including edge devices, enterprise management tools, identity and access management systems, networking infrastructure and other technologies. 

    “The diversity matters, but the discipline matters even more,” Horka said. “Specific device types were consistently reserved for particular positions in the chain. It operated less like a collection of randomly compromised devices and more like an organized inventory of capabilities.”

    The threat group has successfully compromised devices and technologies from Fortinet, Cisco, ManageEngine, Ivanti, F5, Check Point, Palo Alto Networks, ServiceNow, TP-Link, Netgear and ArcGIS, researchers said. Black Lotus Labs also observed confirmed zero-day campaigns targeting Versa Director, N-Able N-Central, Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN and VeloCloud Orchestrator. 

    “The exploitation patterns, victimology, and geographic targeting observed throughout our investigation point to a sustained focus on communications, defense, government, and critical infrastructure environments of enduring strategic value,” Black Lotus Labs researchers wrote in the report. “Through repeated targeting of centralized management platforms and control-plane technologies, Silent Train shows how Volt Typhoon systematically pursues and preserves access to some of the most consequential networks in the United States.”

    Silent Train’s ephemerality and operational discipline means it can’t be measured in size. These attributes also make it “fundamentally difficult to disrupt because there isn’t one network to take down,” Horka said. 

    “What exists today will be completely different tomorrow,” he added. “You can try to remove individual pieces, but removing the actor’s ability to continuously rebuild them is a much harder problem to solve.”

    Source: CyberScoop · 2026-10-28