- Severity: HIGH
- CVE: CVE-2026-71535
- Ecosystems: pip
- Packages: mareforma
### Summary
`mareforma` 0.3.3 contains a critical integrity flaw in the REPLICATED convergence logic (`_maybe_update_replicated_unlocked()` in `mareforma/db/core.py:1300-1319`). The peer-selection SQL query that determines whether two independent claims “agree” on the same anchor does not verify that either claim carries a valid cryptographic signature from an enrolled validator key. Because `rekor_enabled=False` is the default and automatically sets `transparency_logged=1` at insert time, every claim — signed or not — immediately satisfies the convergence precondition. An attacker with no Mareforma key can write an unsigned claim to a shared graph, cause it to converge with a legitimate signed peer claim, and have it promoted to `REPLICATED` status. The forged `REPLICATED` row is then returned by the default trust query (`graph.query(min_support=”REPLICATED”)`), allowing the attacker to inject false trust signals into any downstream consumer relying on `REPLICATED` as a multi-party endorsement guarantee.
### Details
**Root cause — `mareforma/db/core.py:1300-1319`**
The convergence function `_maybe_update_replicated_unlocked()` selects peer claims using a SQL query that filters on `status`, `unresolved`, `transparency_logged`, and `artifact_hash`, but contains no predicate on `signature_bundle` or enrolled-key identity:
“`python
# mareforma/db/core.py:1300-1319
rows = conn.execute(
f”””
SELECT DISTINCT c.claim_id, c.generated_by
FROM claims c, json_each(c.supports_js…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-19