- Severity: HIGH
- CVE: CVE-2026-122247
- Ecosystems: npm
- Packages: @budibase/server
## Description
### Summary
On a self-hosted, single-tenant Budibase instance (`multiTenancy:false`), the public bootstrap endpoint `POST /api/global/users/init` remains fully exploitable **after** the instance has been provisioned. Its “already initialised” guard (`checkAnyUserExists()`) is evaluated inside a **tenant-scoped** database context derived from an **attacker-controlled `tenantId`** in the request body. Because the tenancy layer never constrains that `tenantId` to the only legitimate tenant (`default`) on a single-tenant deployment, an unauthenticated attacker simply supplies any unused tenant name to make the guard see an empty user list, and the endpoint then creates a brand-new CouchDB database (`_global-db`) and a **global-admin** user document (`admin.global = true`, `builder.global = true`) inside it – with no authentication and no CSRF token.
This is (a) a bypass of the security control meant to permanently close first-run setup, and (b) an unauthenticated, persistent write primitive that lets an anonymous attacker create an unbounded number of databases and admin-user documents – a resource-exhaustion / denial-of-service vector against the CouchDB datastore, plus creation of latent rogue admin accounts.
### Details
Root cause chain (source, tag v3.44.0):
1. `packages/worker/src/api/index.ts:41` – `POST /api/global/users/init` is in `PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS`, so `auth.buildAuthMiddleware(PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS)` marks it `publicEndpoint` and the “no public access t…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-20