In August, the Federal Bureau of Investigation announced that it detected and disrupted another Chinese state-sponsored cyberattack targeting U.S. critical infrastructure — the latest in a series that includes the 2025 PlugX malware incident, the 2024 Flax Typhoon hack and the 2023 Volt Typhoon operation. The severity and frequency of these attacks should raise alarms because they show a pattern of America’s adversaries looking for any possible weakness in our sensitive systems to exploit, and in many cases cooperating together to do so.
These attacks are often aimed at the federal government’s own networks, and they are all too often successful. The incoming House and Senate cyber leaders will need to assess and address this vulnerability fast.
The math isn’t on the government’s side. Cyber adversaries only have to be right once, whereas defenders must be right across every system, program and vendor. Unfortunately, the very way that the federal government contracts and manages critical systems makes the job of its cyber defenders much more difficult.
Federal systems are often cobbled together over decades, often with unpredictable budgets, shifting missions and procurement rules that favor incremental fixes over true modernization. The outdated technology is often easy to identify. The more dangerous aspect of the problem is the complexity embedded in federal management efforts, ensuring that addressing the challenge will be hard.
Under the guidance of the Office of Management and Budget and the General Services Administration, federal agencies routinely run three or four generations of systems simultaneously — legacy databases sitting beneath cloud environments, with managed service providers and internal teams each touching different layers, often without a shared map of what connects what. Security is often added later, after missions have changed, the platforms expanded, and new compliance requirements emerged.
Federal information technology spending exceeds $100 billion annually, according to a 2025 R Street Institute report, with as much as 80 percent dedicated to operating and maintaining existing systems. The government spends this $80 billion a year simply to keep old systems secure while adversaries invest in new technologies and techniques to infiltrate them. Adversaries now have access to agentic AI systems to automate their reconnaissance efforts, accelerate exploitation of known vulnerabilities and move through supply chains before a patch cycle completes.
The fragmentation of federal networks and defenses makes it easier for foreign adversaries to penetrate systems, and it poses a significant strategic risk. The federal government may not have the network resilience to continue to operate in a crisis or contingency with China or Russia. Congress is starting to pay attention, but because cyber investment is less tangible than a new fighter jet or missile system and is spread across dozens of authorization and appropriation subcommittees in each chamber, it often takes a back seat.
Congress should treat federal technology modernization as a security imperative with the same urgency it has applied to traditional Defense Department weapons acquisition.
Agencies need procurement pathways that allow trusted security technologies to be adopted without multiyear acquisition cycles. Vendor contracts should define accountability clearly enough that, after a breach, the party responsible can be identified in hours rather than weeks. Platform duplication should also be reduced where it expands the attack surface without adding operational capability.
Weapons acquisition reform is focusing on delivering capabilities to warfighters faster and at lower cost. Federal cybersecurity infrastructure acquisition should be held to the same standard. Faster modernization would make government harder to penetrate and quicker to recover. Government tech debt is a strategic vulnerability, and our adversaries are already exploiting it.
Source: CyberScoop · 2026-11-18