- Severity: HIGH
- CVE: CVE-2026-122244
- Ecosystems: npm
- Packages: @budibase/server
## Description
### Summary
A **low-privileged application end-user** (role `BASIC` – **not** a builder or admin, and on a public data-collection form, an unauthenticated visitor) can store an HTML/JavaScript payload in ordinary row data. When a **builder or admin** later opens that table in the Budibase Builder and evaluates any Handlebars binding whose Preview surfaces the value (the Data-section **Formula** column editor, or any binding drawer), the stored value is rendered as **raw HTML** and the attacker’s JavaScript executes in the Builder’s origin.
The Builder SPA is served by nginx with **no Content-Security-Policy** (the CSP middleware only decorates the server-rendered *published-app* document, not `/builder/`). The injected script therefore runs unrestricted in the highest-trust surface of the product – the admin/builder session that can create datasources, run server-side JavaScript via automations, read and modify every table, and manage users. This is a **cross-privilege stored XSS** (app end-user → builder/admin), i.e. full workspace takeover, not self-XSS.
### Details
**Root cause 1 – the escaper is a no-op.**
`packages/frontend-core/src/utils/jsonFormatter.ts` (`format()`):
“`js
jsonString = jsonString
.replace(/&/g, “&”) // no-op: replaces “&” with “&” (should be “&”)
.replace(//g, “>”) // no-op (should be “>”)
return jsonString.replace(
/(“(\\u[a-zA-Z0-9]{4}|\\[^u]|[^\\”])*”(\s*:)?|\b(true|false|null)\b|-?\d+…)/g,
(match) => {
if (/^”/.…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-20