- Severity: CRITICAL
- CVE: CVE-2026-69157
- Ecosystems: rust
- Packages: atomic-server
## Summary
atomic-server provisions a well-known invite at `{server}/setup` with `write = true`, `target` = the Drive root, and `usagesLeft = 1`. Invite redemption **ignores the redeemer’s identity** (`for_agent: _` in `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:22`), so possession of the URL is the only requirement. An **unauthenticated** attacker who sends `GET /setup?public-key=` has the server create a new Agent and grant it **write access to the entire Drive**. On a freshly deployed (not-yet-claimed) instance this is a full server takeover with no credentials.
## Severity
**Critical — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8).** No authentication required; grants attacker-controlled write over all resources in the Drive.
## Affected component
– `server/src/appstate.rs` — creates the `/setup` invite targeting the Drive root with `write=true`, `usagesLeft=1`.
– `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:14-173` — `construct_invite_redirect` destructures `for_agent: _` (redeemer identity discarded); `?public-key=` → `Agent::new_from_public_key` → `add_rights(agent, target, write=true)`.
## Steps to Reproduce
Environment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop` in Docker, `http://localhost:9883`, fresh store. No auth headers are used.
1. Confirm the invite is live — `GET /setup` (Accept: `application/ad+json`) shows `invite/write = true`, `invite/target = http://localhost:9883` (Drive root), `usagesLeft = 1`.
2. Redeem it anonymously with an attacker-generated ed25519 public key:
“`http…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-18