- Severity: HIGH
- CVE: CVE-2026-69158
- Ecosystems: rust
- Packages: atomic-server
## Summary
Atomic-Server exposes a `GET /bookmark` endpoint that fetches an attacker-supplied URL server-side, parses the response, and reflects the fetched content back to the caller. The endpoint requires no authentication and performs no authorization of its own, and the underlying fetch helper applies no allow-list or private-IP deny-list. An unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the server can force it to issue arbitrary outbound HTTP GET requests to internal-only hosts (loopback services, internal admin panels, link-local cloud-metadata) and read the response body back. This is a full-response SSRF, not a blind one.
## Root cause (source trace)
1. The bookmark endpoint is registered unconditionally for every server: `server/src/appstate.rs:69` (`store.add_endpoint(plugins::bookmark::bookmark_endpoint())`).
2. An unauthenticated caller on the standard GET route becomes `ForAgent::Public`: `server/src/helpers.rs:168-183` (`get_client_agent`).
3. In `get_resource_extended`, when the subject matches an endpoint path the function returns via `call_endpoint` BEFORE the `hierarchy::check_read` authorization call: `lib/src/db.rs:1010-1017` (`if is_endpoint { return self.call_endpoint(…) }`, and `check_read` sits just after at :1017, never reached).
4. `call_endpoint` performs no authorization itself; it only matches the path and invokes the handler: `lib/src/db.rs:662-706`.
5. The bookmark handler discards the caller (`for_agent: _`) and fetches the `url` query pa…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-18