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GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p: Atomic Server: Arbitrary file read via user-controlled `internalId` in the `/download` handler (leaks root agent private key)

  • Severity: HIGH
  • CVE: CVE-2026-69156
  • Ecosystems: rust
  • Packages: atomic-server

## Summary

The Commit apply path enforces **no allowlist of writable properties**, so any authenticated Agent can set the `internalId` string (datatype `string`, no character validation) on a resource it owns. The `/download` handler then uses that value **verbatim** as a filesystem path — `file_path.push(internal_id); NamedFile::open(file_path)` — with **no sanitization and no containment check** (`server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65`). By setting `internalId` to a traversal path (`../../../../etc/passwd`) or an absolute path (`PathBuf::push` of an absolute path replaces the buffer), an attacker reads **any file on the host**. The highest-value target is the server config file storing the **root agent private key**, which yields full server compromise. Only the *upload* path sanitizes filenames (`sanitize_filename`); the *download* path trusts the stored value. The handler also never checks that the resource is a `File`.

## Affected component

– `server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65` — `file_path.push(internal_id)` + `NamedFile::open`, no sanitization, no `File`-class check.
– `lib/src/commit.rs` (`apply_changes`) — sets any property; no server-managed-property denylist.

## Steps to Reproduce

Environment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop`, `http://localhost:9883`. Attacker is any Agent with write on a parent (self-signup, or via the `/setup` issue reported separately).

1. Create a resource and set `internalId` to a traversal path — sign the Commit and `POST /commit`…

Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-18