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GHSA-x277-3wcg-g9r2: Atomic Server: Stored XSS via uploaded files served inline (same-origin) on `/download` → account takeover

  • Severity: HIGH
  • CVE: CVE-2026-69155
  • Ecosystems: rust
  • Packages: atomic-server

## Summary

Files uploaded via `POST /upload` are served back by `GET /download/{path}` using `actix_files::NamedFile`. For `text/html` and `image/svg+xml`, actix-files (0.6.6) sets `Content-Disposition: inline`, so the browser **renders** the file instead of downloading it. The `/download` route sets **no `Content-Security-Policy`, no `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, and no forced `attachment`** (CSP exists only on the SPA route), and files are served from the **same origin** as the app UI. An authenticated Agent uploads `evil.html` containing `STORED-XSS-PROOF
——poc–
“`

Response `200` returns a `downloadURL`, e.g. `http://localhost:9883/download/files/-xss.html`.

2. Inspect how the server serves it:

“`
$ curl -D – http://localhost:9883/download/files/-xss.html
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
content-type: text/html; charset=utf-8
content-disposition: inline; filename=”-xss.html”
# (no Content-Security-Policy, no X-Content-Type-Options)
“`

`text/html` + `inline` + no CSP/nosniff + same origin → the browser executes the uploaded HTML/JS in the app origin. `image/svg+xml` behaves identically.

3. The attacker sends the link to a victim. On open, the script runs same-origin and reads `document.cookie` (session is not HttpOnly) and the Ed25519 private key from IndexedDB → signs Commits as the victim indefinitely.

**Expected:** user files served with `Content-Disposition: attachment` + `nosniff`, or from an isolated origin.
**Actual:** served `inline`, `text/html`, same origin, no…

Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-18