Home/Research/Post

Five Questions About the Future of Global Anticorruption Efforts in the Trump Era

After winning control of the United States Congress and Senate in midterm elections this month, the Democratic Party is expected to mount a firmer resistance to the dismantling of anti-corruption laws, institutions, and norms that has taken place under the Republican administration of President Donald Trump.

As part of Trump’s “America First” approach to foreign policy, the U.S. has narrowed enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the law designed to prohibit U.S. citizens or companies from bribing foreign officials for business, officially withdrawn from GRECO, the Council of Europe’s anti-corruption body, and gutted the U.S. Corporate Transparency Act, a 2020 law aimed at combating money laundering and illicit finance.

Kevin E. Davis, Beller Family Professor of Business Law at the New York University School of Law, discusses these changes and which foreign powers may fill the void that Trump’s administration has left in prosecuting transnational corruption.

In 2019, you published a book, “Between Impunity and Imperialism: The Regulation of Transnational Bribery,” which criticized the U.S.-led approach to tackling transnational bribery that was in place before the Trump administration curtailed enforcement of the FCPA. How has your thinking changed since then? 

My focus in the book was on what I saw as the imperialistic aspects of the multilateral regime that was led by the United States, but I think it was becoming a truly multilateral machine. It was dominated by the members of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), even though its effects were felt around the world.

So, I’ve been concerned about whether all the countries who were affected by the regime had a say in its design. And that was my concern back in 2019 –  it was about that multilateral issue. Some of those concerns seem rather quaint now, because what we have now is — at least on a part of the U.S. — something that fits a more traditional conception of imperialism or legal imperialism. It’s avowedly not multilateral, it is “America First,” and it is explicitly motivated by self interest. They have eschewed one of the basic principles of the OECD regime, which is that enforcement should be impartial, as opposed to self-interested. 

Under the OECD regime, it’s quite clear that you’re not supposed to target enforcement to advantage your national champions, right? So you can’t target your competitors, and you can’t provide leniency to your own firms. Whereas the enforcement guidelines that the Trump administration has adopted quite explicitly embraced the idea of putting American interests first in making enforcement decisions. So it’s quite different in that respect.
It’s also different in that the U.S. has scaled back the overall level of enforcement, which again is contrary to the thrust of the previous regime, which was all about increasing the resources devoted to antibribery enforcement. So, both in terms of the selectivity and the reduction of enforcement efforts, I think what we’re seeing is a marked departure from the previous model. 

When the U.S. steps back from multilateral institutions, who fills the void in shaping international commercial and anti-corruption law?

It’s not entirely clear how much they’re stepping back from the OECD framework, but in anti-corruption it’s clear that they’ve stepped back from organizations like GRECO (Group of States Against Corruption) and the Open Government Partnership.

Who will feel the void is less clear. The U.K. and France and Switzerland have announced their taskforce that I think can only be interpreted as being motivated, at least in part, by concerns about the gap being left by the U.S. stepping back. I haven’t seen any concrete results of that initiative, so I think it’s too soon to say what will happen there, but it is possible that we will see other members of the OECD stepping up to some extent to fill the gap.

The other possibility, of course, is that China will play a greater role. They have new draft legislation that will consolidate some of their prior laws, but also extend them, to allow them to be more active about sanctioning transnational bribery and other forms of corruption. So they may not necessarily fill the gap, because I think a lot of the activities of Chinese firms were beyond the scope of U.S. enforcement activity anyway. But if there is an increase in Chinese enforcement, that may offset some of the reductions in enforcement effort that we see on the part of the U.S.

And then, of course, the other possibility is that host countries will respond — countries whose officials are being corrupted, and they will do more. So all those countries where the U.S. firms are paying bribes of course have legislation on the books that would allow them to prosecute those firms for paying bribes, as well as prosecuting the officials [who take bribes]. And they could respond too, so we’ll see.

Now that both legislative bodies have flipped to their control, what can the Democratic Party do to legally counter the Trump administration’s rollback of U.S. anti-corruption policies?

The prospect of a presidential veto will make it difficult for the new Congress to use legislative measures to counter the Trump administration’s actions. However, in the anti-corruption space there may be particular symbolic and political value in forcing the President and his allies in Congress to take a public position on reforms.

To the extent the next Congress does contemplate anti-corruption measures, in addition to new legislation it may consider using the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to overturn FINCEN’s (U.S. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network) August rule that exempted U.S. actors from the Corporate Transparency Act. However, the CRA only permits disapproval of rules issued near the end of a previous Congressional session and it is not yet clear whether the FINCEN rule will fall within the statute’s lookback window. And again, any such legislative act is virtually certain to be blocked by the President.

 It is worth noting, however, that the legality of that FINCEN rule is open to challenge. It effectively repeals the CTA and it is not at all clear that an agency like FINCEN has the authority to do that.

Which challenges to American anti-corruption norms have concerned you the most over the past couple of years?

I think it’s the conflicts of interest on the part of U.S. officials, and the unapologetic nature of the conflicts of interest. I think that actually sets a certain tone, and has suggested that certain kinds of conduct are acceptable, and I actually think that may have more of an effect than any shifts in enforcement policy. So that’s something I found quite concerning.

I’ll also mention a pet peeve of mine: Not everyone even sees this as a form of corruption, but the U.S. now has a policy of denying visas, or revoking the visas of foreign officials who basically oppose their interests, and they’ve been quite open about that. I actually think that’s difficult to reconcile with the norm against corruption. The idea that public officials’ duties should be to their constituents, and that efforts that influence them to put their private interests above the public interest ought to be condemned as forms of corruption. I think the current U.S. policy is actually inconsistent with that norm of prohibiting corruption. I may be alone in that view, but it is something that has concerned me in recent years.

In one of your most cited articles, you and your co-author analyzed a dataset of FCPA enforcement actions resolved between 2004 and 2011 and found they were heavily influenced by foreign policy and international relations factors, going beyond the legal criteria explicitly written into U.S. or international law. That predated even the first Trump presidency. Since then, you have called for a more inclusive and experimental approach to transnational bribery law. In broad terms, what would that look like?

The first article you mentioned goes to show that concerns about national interests have probably always influenced enforcement practices in at least the U.S., and to a certain extent, that may be inevitable.

In terms of being more inclusive, my concern has always been about the interests of the countries whose officials are being corrupted, because in the typical case, those are the countries that bear most of the harm from corruption, and as a consequence, are most affected by anti-corruption policy. And sometimes their interests diverge from those of countries like the U.S. or the U.K. or France or Switzerland.

Sometimes the reason for the divergence is obvious, like who gets to capture the recoveries from enforcement activities. So should the fines and forfeitures imposed in, say, FCPA actions or money laundering prosecutions be retained by the enforcing country, or should they be remitted to the country whose official was corrupted? There’s potentially a conflict of interest there, and I’ve generally been sympathetic to the idea that there should be more sharing with what we can call the host countries.

So there are issues like that, or the extent to which leniency should be granted in exchange for information that’s used to prosecute the public officials. There is also potentially a conflict of interest there. Those are issues I’ve been concerned with over the years. More recently, I’ve written about the fact that countries like Brazil, [where] officials have been corrupted by both domestic and foreign actors, have undertaken a lot of enforcement. They’ve developed some very sophisticated techniques, and they’ve learned some important lessons about what works and what doesn’t. And I’ve been interested in whether the multilateral regime has picked up on some of those lessons, both the positive and the negative ones. On that front, the evidence is mixed.

Source: OCCRP · 2026-11-13