- Severity: MEDIUM
- CVE: CVE-2026-63386
- Ecosystems: npm
- Packages: js-toml
## Summary
`load()` parses untrusted TOML using a recursive-descent parser (Chevrotain) and a
recursive tree-walking interpreter. Neither the parser nor the interpreter enforces a
maximum nesting / key depth. A small, attacker-controlled document with deep nesting
(arrays, inline tables) or a long dotted key drives recursion past the V8 call-stack
limit, and `load()` throws an **uncaught `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`**.
This is a problem for two reasons:
1. **Denial of Service.** A tiny payload (≈2 KB) reliably aborts parsing. In any
service that parses user-supplied TOML, an unhandled `RangeError` can crash the
worker/process (500 / restart loop).
2. **Error-contract violation.** The library signals invalid input via
`SyntaxParseError` (see `src/load/exception.ts`; the entire test suite asserts
`SyntaxParseError`). Consumers that follow this contract —
“`js
try { load(input); }
catch (e) {
if (e instanceof SyntaxParseError) return badRequest();
throw e; // unexpected -> propagates
}
“`
— will **re-throw** the `RangeError` instead of treating the input as malformed,
turning malformed input into an unexpected fatal error.
## Impact
– Unauthenticated attacker who can supply a TOML string to an application using
`js-toml` can force `load()` to throw a non-`SyntaxParseError` error.
– If the error is not caught by a generic handler, the Node.js process terminates
(availability impact).
– Even when caught generically, the documented/expected…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-20