- Severity: MEDIUM
- CVE: CVE-2026-103033
- Ecosystems: go
- Packages: github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-go/v2
### Summary
`parseServerSignature` in the v1 module only initializes `ServerSignatureVerificationData.Extra` inside the `if err == nil` branch after `url.ParseQuery(parsedPayload.VerificationData)`. Go’s `url.ParseQuery` returns the successfully-parsed pairs together with a non-nil error when the query string contains a malformed percent-escape. A subsequent loop unconditionally writes unknown keys into `Extra`, regardless of `err`, causing a nil-map write panic (assignment to entry in nil map) whenever an attacker supplies a `VerificationData` string with a bad %-escape (e.g. `x=1&%zz=2`).
This is reachable pre-authentication: `parseServerSignature` is called by the exported `VerifyServerSignature` / `VerifyServerSignatureSafe` before any HMAC/signature check, and `VerificationData` is attacker-controlled data forwarded by the client as part of the ALTCHA server-signature payload.
### Impact
Any application calling `VerifyServerSignature` or `VerifyServerSignatureSafe` on unauthenticated input can be made to panic by submitting a crafted payload. Under standard net/http, the per-request goroutine panic is recovered and the request aborts (a log-flood / per-request DoS); it escalates to a full process crash if verification runs in an application-spawned goroutine or a non-recovering framework.
### Proof Of Concept
“`go
payload, _ := json.Marshal(ServerSignaturePayload{
Algorithm: SHA256,
VerificationData: “x=1&%zz=2”,
Signature: “irrelevant”,
Verified: true,
})
enc…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-20