- Severity: MEDIUM
- CVE: CVE-2026-102945
- Ecosystems: go
- Packages: github.com/omec-project/amf
## Summary
HandlePathSwitchRequest guards the UESecurityCapabilities IE for presence but never for length, and the extensible APER type silently yields an empty bit string, so six unguarded index-zero reads panic on an unrecovered goroutine and terminate the AMF. The AMF is the control-plane entry point for a 5G core, so terminating it drops mobility management for every subscriber. Confirmed at HEAD daed5a2 (present in v3.1.5).
## The defect
ngap/handler.go:
“`go
if uESecurityCapabilities != nil { // line 3267, PRESENCE only
amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA1_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80) >> 7) // line 3268
… (five more Bytes[0] reads, lines 3269-3273)
}
“`
Six index-zero reads, all guarded only by a nil check on the containing IE. Why the bit string can be empty: the field is declared `aper:”sizeExt,sizeLB:16,sizeUB:16″`. Because the type is EXTENSIBLE, parseBitString DISCARDS the SIZE(16) constraint when the peer sets the extension bit, and then `if rawLength == 0 { return bitString, nil }` returns a bit string with an empty Bytes slice and NO ERROR. So the decoder hands the handler a well-formed, error-free value whose Bytes has length zero, and the handler indexes it. The length guarantee the maintainers rely on comes from an ASN.1 SIZE constraint that the encoder rules legitimately waive on the extension path.
## Verification
Proven dynamically, not by reading. Eight crafted bytes (40 00 80 00 80 00 80 00) decod…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-20