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GHSA-q8v2-3j4h-xg2p: Jane: Instantiation RCE via query parameter name -> raw PHPDoc */ breakout (jane-php/open-api-3)

  • Severity: CRITICAL
  • CVE: CVE-2026-63412
  • Ecosystems: composer
  • Packages: jane-php/open-api-3

### Summary
jane-php (open-api-3) builds PHP via nikic/php-parser (AST), so string literals are escaped — but PHPDoc comment text is emitted RAW. The generated Client/Endpoint method docblocks embed the query parameter name verbatim in a `@param array{ “”?: … }` block. A `*/` in the query name closes the `/** … */` docblock early and lands in class-body position; because the name is a raw string key (not identifier-mangled), the `*/` and following PHP survive. Injecting `*/ public function __construct(){ } /*` adds an attacker-controlled __construct to the generated Client class, which runs when the client is instantiated -> RCE (CWE-94). Verified 7.11.2/PHP8.1.

### Impact
Generating a client from an attacker-influenced OpenAPI document and using the generated SDK (instantiating the client, which apps do on every call) runs attacker PHP. CWE-94/95/116.

### PoC
`reproduce.sh` (+ `make_spec.py`, `gen.php`): scaffolds a composer project with jane-php/open-api-3, generates, instantiates the generated Client, shows the marker.

### Suggested fix
Neutralize `*/` (e.g. `*/`->`* /`) in all generated PHPDoc text (parameter names, descriptions). Regression-test with a parameter name/description containing `*/`.

[maintainer-report.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29497099/maintainer-report.txt)
[reproduce.sh](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29497102/reproduce.sh)
[gen.php](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29497103/gen.php)
[make_spec.py](https://…

Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-19