- Severity: MEDIUM
- CVE: CVE-2026-71533
- Ecosystems: pip
- Packages: mareforma
## What’s wrong
`search_claims` never calls `_row_verified_on_read`. Its row loop applies only the PRELIMINARY-unenrolled filter, then appends the row. `query_claims` runs the same projection but additionally re-verifies REPLICATED/ESTABLISHED signatures on read (line 4023) and drops any row that fails, per the documented tamper guarantee in the comment block above it: a high-trust row whose signature does not verify is excluded from query results entirely.
So a tampered or forged high-trust row splits the two read paths. Any process with DB write access, or an attacker copying a genuine validation envelope onto a fresh row, can flip a row to ESTABLISHED. `query()` drops it; `search()` serves it at its persisted trust level. Verified in a runtime check against a forged ESTABLISHED row:
“`
query() returns forged row: False
search() returns forged row: True # support_level ESTABLISHED, ‘verified’ key absent
“`
The docstring makes this worse: `search_claims` promises “the same projection as query_claims” and that the `include_unverified` filter “applies identically”, so callers reasonably trust search results equally. The forged row also lacks the `verified` key entirely, so a consumer cannot tell it went unchecked.
## Severity and impact
**High.** The verify-on-read tamper exclusion is a stated trust guarantee, and search is a primary read surface. A forged ESTABLISHED finding that query correctly rejects is served by search as genuine, with no marker that verification…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-19