- Severity: LOW
- CVE: CVE-2026-118780
- Ecosystems: npm
- Packages: node-forge
### Summary
When a CA store created by `pki.createCaStore()` holds two or more certificates with the same subject name, `pki.verifyCertificateChain()` permanently removes those certificates from the store while trying each one as the issuer. A peer can send any certificate that names that subject as its issuer to make all later verifications against those CA certificates fail. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1.
### Details
`pki.verifyCertificateChain()` (`lib/x509.js`) asks the CA store for the issuer of each certificate with `caStore.getIssuer()`. When the store holds several certificates with the same subject, `caStore.getIssuer()` returns the store’s own internal array of those certificates (`caStore.certs[hash]`, built by `addCertificate()`). `verifyCertificateChain()` used that array directly as its list of candidate parents and called `parents.shift()` on it while trying each candidate. Every candidate it tried, including the one that finally verified the certificate, was removed from the store.
Once the array is empty, `getIssuer()` returns an empty list, no candidate is tried, and verification fails with “Certificate signature is invalid.” `hasCertificate()` and `listAllCertificates()` no longer see the removed certificates. The store stays in this state for as long as the object is used.
The attacker’s certificate only needs an issuer name equal to the shared subject name, which is public. Its signature and key can be arbitrary: every candidate is tried and shifted out…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-10-30