Day: October 16, 2026

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Source: GAO Reports & Testimonies · 2026-10-16

What GAO Found

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) funds extramural research through awards to universities and other institutions. Implementation of federal research security requirements helps safeguard this research from foreign interference, including misappropriation and unauthorized access by foreign countries and entities.

NIH implemented 14 of the 15 federal research security requirements GAO reviewed that address: (1) disclosure, (2) malign foreign talent recruitment programs, (3) research security training and programs, and (4) collaboration and information sharing. These requirements apply across federal research agencies and include actions NIH must take, as well as requirements it must impose on grant applicants, recipients, and specified individuals. For the remaining requirement concerning certification by certain recipient institutions that they have established and operate research security programs, NIH is working with an interagency group to implement the requirement.

NIH relies heavily on self-reported information disclosed by researchers and institutions to identify and manage foreign interference risks and generally does not verify such disclosures using sources outside those required during pre-award risk assessments unless it receives a foreign interference allegation. Additionally, NIH does not require disclosure of all past affiliations, and foreign component disclosures are only required when the collaboration involves the performance of a significant element or segment of the NIH-funded project outside of the United States. As a result, NIH may not identify risks when relevant information is not required to be disclosed or is left out.

From 2017 through 2025, NIH received 697 allegations of potential foreign interference involving personnel on NIH awards. NIH identified disclosure violations in 264 cases, and NIH or recipient institutions took one or more actions in most of those cases, such as prohibiting individuals from participating on awards.

NIH Allegations of Potential Foreign Interference and Outcomes, 2017–2025

Total number of allegations

(697)

Violations found
(264)

Action taken by NIH or recipient institution (223)

No actions taken (41)

No violations found

(433)

 

Action taken by NIH or recipient institution (45)

No actions taken (388)

Source: GAO analysis of National Institutes of Health data. | GAO-27-107848

In seven nongeneralizable case studies, GAO used outside sources to identify publicly available information about foreign affiliations and coauthored publications that did not appear in the award documentation. These cases do not establish the prevalence of undisclosed information or foreign interference across NIH awards but illustrate potential limitations of NIH’s disclosure-based process.

NIH’s risk management program is fully aligned with GAO’s enterprise risk management practices but not fully aligned with GAO’s Fraud Risk Framework. Although NIH’s annual risk inventory considers fraud, it is not a documented extramural-program-specific assessment of fraud schemes, controls, and residual risks. Without such an assessment, NIH lacks a documented basis for determining whether its controls and monitoring activities address the most significant fraud risks and are adjusted as those risks evolve.

Why GAO Did This Study

The U.S. has long promoted an open and collaborative research environment, but policymakers have raised concerns that foreign countries and entities may exploit the openness of the federally funded research enterprise to undermine national security and economic competitiveness. In fiscal year 2025 alone, NIH awarded about $35 billion in extramural funding.

GAO was asked to review NIH’s efforts to safeguard extramural research from foreign interference and related ethical concerns. This report examines, among other things: (1) NIH’s implementation of selected federal research security requirements, (2) the extent to which NIH identifies and manages foreign interference risks in its extramural research program, and (3) the alignment of NIH’s risk management policies and practices with GAO risk management practices.

GAO reviewed relevant legal authorities, policies, and NIH documentation; analyzed NIH foreign interference allegation data from 2017 through 2025; conducted seven nongeneralizable case studies of NIH awards selected based on their potential for heightened foreign interference risk; compared NIH practices with GAO risk management frameworks; and interviewed NIH and Department of Health and Human Services officials.

Source: GAO Reports & Testimonies · 2026-10-16

What GAO Found

The Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear waste cleanup is proceeding largely under three laws that set cleanup and waste management requirements. Each law has different requirements, applications, and regulators.

Selected Cleanup and Waste Management Laws and Regulators for the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Nuclear Waste Cleanup

GAO and experts GAO convened with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine identified several legal and regulatory factors that affect the cost and schedule of DOE’s nuclear waste cleanup.

Certain state regulatory actions may exceed state authority. According to experts who participated in GAO’s National Academies meetings, some states are taking legal and regulatory actions that address the radiological aspects of nuclear waste at DOE’s cleanup sites, which are generally regulated by DOE under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Such actions may exceed a state’s authority to regulate hazardous waste under authorizations from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as amended (RCRA). These state actions have led to disagreements between DOE and states on requirements for the radiological portion of DOE’s waste, longer cleanup schedules, and billions in higher costs for the federal government, according to experts.

Courts have recognized that DOE’s authority to manage and regulate its nuclear waste under the Atomic Energy Act preempts certain state regulatory actions that impact DOE’s management of nuclear waste during its cleanup efforts. However, based on GAO’s analysis, statutes and case law are unclear on what kinds of state actions that affect DOE’s management and cleanup of radioactive waste are appropriate under the law, in part because of the prevalence of mixed waste at DOE cleanup sites. According to experts, because states are often taking such actions under state programs that are authorized by EPA to implement a federal law (RCRA), EPA could play a more active role in addressing instances where states may be improperly seeking to regulate radioactive materials covered by the Atomic Energy Act. EPA officials told us they currently do not have authority to challenge such state actions, as long as those actions are at least as stringent as federal requirements. If Congress clarifies the scope of the Atomic Energy Act’s preemption—and creates a mechanism that allows for DOE to appeal to EPA to evaluate state actions that may infringe on federal authority over nuclear waste covered by the Atomic Energy Act—costly and resource-intensive legal disputes could be reduced and decision-making could be accelerated.

Assumptions about anticipated future land and groundwater use are sometimes unrealistic and can unnecessarily increase costs and schedules. Under the applicable laws and regulations, DOE’s cleanup of its sites is based, in part, on the anticipated future uses of land and groundwater for an area. According to experts at GAO’s meetings, DOE is cleaning up some areas based on unrealistic assumptions about those future uses. For example, DOE has agreed with state regulators and EPA to clean up large portions of some sites to allow for future residential use, even though there are no plans for such use. DOE did not evaluate the costs associated with cleaning up to less stringent standards associated with different land uses in those cases.

By comparison, realistic decisions about future land use have been critical to the successful cleanup of other DOE sites, such as at Rocky Flats in Colorado. After Congress designated that site as a national wildlife refuge in 2001, cleanup costs decreased from an estimated $23 billion for residential use to about $10 billion.

Historical Disposal (left) and Its Cleanup (right) at Idaho National Laboratory

According to experts, a better framework for making realistic assumptions about future land use at DOE’s cleanup sites is needed. For example, DOE could assess benefits and costs associated with cleanup based on a range of potential future land uses. Clarification from Congress, and additional guidance from EPA and DOE, on incorporating future land use assumptions into the cleanup process would better position DOE to select appropriate cleanup approaches that are realistic, cost-effective, and aligned with congressional expectations.

The legal framework often requires DOE to clean up contaminated groundwater to meet drinking water standards, but, according to experts, the assumption that groundwater beneath contaminated sites will be used for drinking water in the future is sometimes unrealistic. Further, according to experts, standards for certain contaminants that can apply to groundwater are based on outdated information from the 1960s and may affect the feasibility of cleanup. By accounting for current scientific information, DOE may be able to achieve cleanup that is both protective and avoids unnecessary expenditures.

Other aspects of the legal and regulatory framework for DOE’s nuclear cleanup are sources of conflict and affect costs and schedule. For example, DOE entered into various cleanup agreements with EPA and states in the 1990s before the extent of contamination was fully known. These agreements include hundreds of milestones that DOE has sometimes struggled to meet.

In a poll, all experts at GAO’s meetings recommended that DOE and EPA create an interagency task force of experts to review high-priority cleanup decisions and areas of legal and regulatory disagreement for opportunities to make DOE’s cleanup approach more risk-informed and cost-effective. Having an independent task force provide recommendations to DOE and EPA—such as when disagreements occur over revising cleanup agreements—may help to allow for cleanup approaches that more efficiently complete DOE’s cleanup mission.

Why GAO Did This Study

DOE is cleaning up nuclear sites across the country, the majority of which were created during World War II and the Cold War to research and produce nuclear weapons. DOE has estimated it could take until 2100 and cost $641 billion to $840 billion dollars to complete its nuclear waste cleanup mission. Much of the waste at DOE sites is mixed waste, meaning that it includes both radiological and hazardous constituents. Radioactive waste emits radiation, sometimes for thousands of years. Hazardous waste may be toxic, corrosive, ignitable, or reactive.

Under a complex legal and regulatory framework, DOE and regulators (EPA and states) make decisions that affect the cost and schedule of DOE’s nuclear cleanup efforts. For years, organizations have reported on the ways in which this framework has affected DOE’s ability to complete its nuclear waste cleanup mission, such as through inconsistent decision-making processes for similar risks across sites.

GAO was asked to review the impact of the legal and regulatory framework on DOE’s nuclear waste cleanup mission. This report examines (1) how state legal and regulatory actions affect DOE’s ability to manage the radiological portions of nuclear waste at its cleanup sites, (2) how DOE’s cleanup efforts are affected by assumptions about future land and groundwater use under the applicable legal framework, and (3) other aspects of the legal and regulatory framework that can contribute to higher cleanup costs and longer schedules.

GAO convened a series of expert meetings with the National Academies; conducted legal research, a literature review, and four case studies across six DOE cleanup sites; and interviewed DOE, EPA, and state officials.

Source: GAO Reports & Testimonies · 2026-10-16

What GAO Found

The Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM) administers mining claims that grant the exclusive right to extract critical and other hardrock minerals from most federal lands. U.S. mining laws include citizenship requirements for individuals and business entities holding such claims, known as mining claimants. Under these laws, mining claimants generally must be U.S. citizens, which can include individuals as well as business entities incorporated in a U.S. state or territory. Foreign entities are not qualified to be claimants, but their subsidiaries can hold claims if they are incorporated in the U.S. Mining claimants are not required to disclose to BLM if they are a subsidiary of another entity, foreign or domestic, and they do not have to provide information on any foreign investment they may receive.

Under BLM’s regulations and guidance, the agency collects basic identifying information from individuals and business entities holding mining claims. However, BLM generally does not collect citizenship information and does not document if mining claimants meet the U.S. citizenship requirements. In addition, BLM officials said the agency rarely verifies the citizenship of mining claimants. As a result, BLM generally does not know whether mining claimants are qualified to hold mining claims.

Information the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Collects from Mining Claimants

GAO analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of 15 mining claimants that appeared to be business entities and could not find evidence that seven of the claimants were incorporated in the U.S., as required. BLM was unable to help determine if these entities met the requirement to be incorporated in the U.S. because it did not have the necessary information to do so. Until BLM directs staff to collect citizenship information and document that mining claimants meet the U.S. citizenship requirements, BLM lacks reasonable assurance that only qualified individuals and business entities hold mining claims that allow them to extract and profit from the minerals produced on federal lands.

Australia and Canada—examples of top mineral-producing countries—collect detailed information on foreign investors in businesses in their countries. They can use this information to restrict foreign investments in mining and other sectors by prohibiting certain investments or imposing conditions, as each country has done in some cases in recent years. In addition, both countries limit the ability of foreign state-owned enterprises and other foreign investors to acquire control of businesses involving critical minerals.

Why GAO Did This Study

Critical minerals are vital to the U.S. economy and national security. Federal lands are a significant source of hardrock minerals and include some mining operations supported by foreign investments, according to BLM officials. The administration and Congress have expressed concern about U.S. reliance on foreign sources for critical minerals, and the President has called for expanding mineral production from federal lands.

GAO was asked to review issues related to foreign entities’ involvement in mining on federal lands. This report examines (1) the extent to which BLM collects, documents, and reviews mining claimants’ citizenship information and (2) how selected mineral-producing countries address foreign investments in mining. GAO was also asked to report on the extent of foreign investment in mining on federal lands (see GAO-27-108094).

GAO reviewed U.S. laws and regulations; analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of mining claimants to assess if they appear to meet citizenship requirements; examined BLM documents; visited three BLM state offices; and interviewed officials and representatives from BLM and other federal and nonfederal entities. GAO also reviewed Australian and Canadian laws, guidance, reports, and written responses to questions.

Source: GAO Reports & Testimonies · 2026-10-16

What GAO Found

The U.S critical mineral supply chain faces numerous constraints, including the need for substantial capital investment and limited domestic processing capacity. The U.S. exports large quantities of domestically extracted ore to Canada, Mexico, and China, among other countries.

Copper Mine on Federal Lands

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service oversee hardrock mines on federal land. As of February 2026, there were 632 approved hardrock mining plans of operation on federal land. The 1872 Mining Law generally requires mining claimants to be U.S. citizens or business entities incorporated in the U.S. Foreign businesses can meet this requirement by having a U.S. subsidiary serve as the claimant. While there is limited available information on the full extent of foreign investment in mining on federal lands and parent-subsidiary relationships, GAO reviewed ownership information of 43 claimants and operators associated with critical mineral mines on federal lands. GAO determined ownership for 32 of those companies and found that 14 were subsidiaries of foreign entities. GAO found that none of the 14 had Chinese-owned parent companies, but in at least two cases, Chinese entities had financial interest in the foreign parent companies.

The 1872 Mining Law does not contain a provision requiring BLM or Forest Service to collect information on foreign parent companies nor does it require claimants or operators to submit information regarding foreign ownership. However, other federal agencies have some authorities and processes to identify foreign investment in mining. For example, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, chaired by the Department of the Treasury, can review foreign investment in mining as it relates to potential national security concerns.

Why GAO Did This Study

Critical minerals are essential to the economic and national security of the United States. These minerals, including copper, lithium, and zinc, are key components in advanced technologies and have vulnerable supply chains.

As demand for these minerals increases, U.S. access to critical minerals has become a key topic in domestic policymaking and international relations. Recently, the administration and Congressional entities have expressed concerns over U.S. dependence on imports and the role of potential adversary nations, such as the People’s Republic of China (China), in the U.S. supply chain of critical minerals.

Most critical minerals that can be mined in the U.S. are obtained through hardrock mining, some of which occurs on federal lands. However, policymakers have raised questions about the full amount and extent of foreign investment in those mines.

This report provides information on hardrock mining that occurs on federal lands, foreign investment in mining on federal lands, and steps federal agencies take to identify foreign investment. It also provides information on the amount of extracted critical minerals exported from the U.S. from 2019 through 2025. GAO reviewed ownership information using a variety of sources for 43 claimants and operators associated with critical mineral mines, analyzed federal laws, and interviewed officials. In a related report (GAO-27-108196), GAO reports on BLM’s role in collecting citizenship information from mining claimants.

For more information, contact Dr. Nagla’a El-Hodiri at elhodirin@gao.gov.

Source: GAO Reports & Testimonies · 2026-10-16

What GAO Found

Ghost preparers are paid tax preparers who do not comply with requirements to identify themselves on tax returns they prepare for others. Ghost preparers may intentionally leave identifying information off to get away with filing fraudulent income tax returns, stealing taxpayers’ refunds, and stealing taxpayers’ identities. Courts have ordered individual ghost preparers to pay millions in restitution to the government, but according to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) officials, the total effect of ghost preparers is likely greater, in part, because ghost preparers are difficult to detect.

IRS maintains some data on identified ghost preparers, but the systems IRS uses to track ghost preparer cases and outcomes are not connected and have limitations that impede their usefulness. As a result, IRS does not know how many ghost preparers it has identified, investigated, and addressed. Better understanding existing data, including its limitations, would help IRS direct enforcement resources and protect taxpayers from fraudulent returns or stolen refunds.

IRS identifies and addresses ghost preparers through data analysis, referrals, taxpayer education, and enforcement actions such as investigations. However, these efforts are fragmented across six offices and IRS is missing opportunities to share information and better address risks. A comprehensive, coordinated preparer strategy, including efforts addressing ghost preparers, could help IRS better align resources with risks and identify additional needs.

Notional Example of Fragmented Activities Compared to a Comprehensive, Coordinated Strategy

While IRS has some activities to address ghost preparers, including data analysis and taxpayer education, it has not developed measurable objectives or performance goals. Defining objectives, goals, and performance measures could help IRS reliably assess whether its efforts are reducing ghost preparer activity and adjust its strategy and allocate resources more effectively.

Why GAO Did This Study

Paid tax preparers prepared more than half of all tax returns in fiscal year 2025 and have an enormous effect on IRS’s ability to administer tax laws effectively. However, ghost preparers may hide their identities to avoid accountability and leave taxpayers responsible for inaccurate or fraudulent returns they prepare.

GAO was asked to examine IRS’s efforts to address ghost preparers. This report (1) describes how ghost preparers have harmed taxpayers and IRS, (2) assesses the extent to which IRS maintains data on ghost preparers, and (3) evaluates IRS actions to identify and address ghost preparers.

GAO reviewed federal court cases, and IRS documentation and data. GAO compared IRS’s efforts to leading practices for evidence-based policymaking and consumer education planning. GAO also interviewed IRS and Department of Justice officials and stakeholder groups, such as IRS oversight and industry groups.

Source: GAO Reports & Testimonies · 2026-10-16

What GAO Found

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), non-traditional intelligence collectors (NTCs) are individuals whose primary profession is not intelligence collection, but who actively or passively collect sensitive U.S. information on behalf of foreign entities. For example, researchers and students at universities may act as NTCs if they collect non-public research on behalf of a foreign entity. According to the FBI, unlike intelligence officers, NTCs function independently of established intelligence organizations.

FBI officials and representatives from academic associations identified several challenges in addressing threats posed by NTCs. For example, FBI officials said that it is difficult to identify and investigate NTCs because their activities may not constitute a violation of the law until information is transferred to foreign entities. Also, there are cultural differences between the FBI and academia that may impede communication, as academic institutions promote the free exchange of information, and, according to FBI officials, may not want to be perceived as “turning over” their students.

FBI offices involved in mitigating and investigating threats posed by NTCs are the Office of Private Sector, which leads information-sharing and engagement with the private sector, and the Counterintelligence and Espionage Division. The FBI also uses the National Counterintelligence Task Force and field office-based Counterintelligence Task Forces to coordinate with partner agencies.

Interplay Between FBI’s Headquarters and Field Offices in Mitigating Threats Posed by NTCs

According to FBI officials, building relationships between field offices and academic institutions is important, so academic institutions come to the FBI for assistance in addressing NTCs. FBI officials also said they rely on tips from academia to identify potential NTCs. Publicly, FBI officials have stated that relationships with academic institutions need strengthening to address research security issues. Academic association representatives similarly have said the FBI could improve outreach efforts and that relationships between the FBI and universities are stronger at some universities than others. However, the FBI did not identify a plan for strengthening partnerships with academic institutions. Without strong partnerships, the FBI’s ability to counter NTC threats and protect U.S. research, intellectual property, and technological advantage is hindered.

Why GAO Did This Study

U.S. national security and economic interests are heavily dependent on technological innovation and advantage. According to FBI officials, NTCs pose a significant insider threat to U.S. information, intellectual property, and technological advantage.

GAO was asked to review the FBI’s efforts to investigate and address threats posed by NTCs. This report provides information on the challenges posed by NTCs, the FBI offices involved in mitigating and investigating threats posed by NTCs, and the relationships between the FBI and academic institutions relative to NTC threats, among other things.

To conduct this work, GAO reviewed laws and statutes related to the FBI’s authorities to investigate federal crimes and national security threats, analyzed documentary evidence to understand how key offices interact and coordinate with each other, and reviewed the mechanisms the FBI uses to coordinate its efforts with other federal agencies, academia, and the private sector. GAO also interviewed FBI officials and representatives from academic associations and private industry, selected based on their experiences in addressing NTC activities in academia and the private sector.

Source: GAO Reports & Testimonies · 2026-10-16

What GAO Found

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) oversees a $25 billion annual budget and approximately 70,000 management and operating contractor personnel to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear nonproliferation efforts. NNSA took steps to build its federal workforce to meet mission needs in 2024, with its workforce peaking at 1,991 early in fiscal year 2025. However, since then through the second quarter of fiscal year 2026, NNSA has reduced its federal workforce by 236 employees—or 11.9 percent. These reductions have impacted NNSA’s mission critical workforce, including occupations like nuclear engineers and contract specialists.

Number of National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Federal Employees and Annual Appropriations, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023–FY 2026 Quarter (Q) 2

Note: The Federal Salaries and Expenses appropriation account funds the salaries, benefits, and other related expenses for most of NNSA’s federal workforce.

The reduction of NNSA’s workforce occurred because of two primary reasons: (1) very limited hiring and (2) employee separations—primarily employees choosing to retire or resign. Hiring was limited during the second quarter of fiscal year 2025 through the first quarter of fiscal year 2026.

Why GAO Did This Study

NNSA—a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE)—has a current workload that is at its highest level since the Cold War as the agency oversees a $200 billion, 2-decades-long effort to modernize nuclear weapons and related infrastructure.

In May 2024 (GAO-24-106167), GAO found NNSA continued to face challenges recruiting and retaining federal staff to meet the agency’s mission needs, even though a statutory cap limiting the number of its federal employees was eliminated in fiscal year 2023. NNSA committed to developing a workforce planning process intended to inform future budget requests in response to its increased workload, the elimination of the cap, and consistent with GAO’s May 2024 report. The agency began building its workforce to meet mission needs in 2024. However, in response to presidential directives in early 2025, NNSA reduced the size of its federal workforce.

GAO was asked to examine NNSA’s retirements, resignations, terminations, and other voluntary or involuntary workforce reductions since January 2025. This report describes changes to NNSA’s federal workforce from the beginning of fiscal year 2023 through the second quarter of fiscal year 2026. GAO analyzed relevant NNSA data for workforce and personnel actions, including hires and separations, by program, office, and location. GAO also reviewed NNSA budget information and interviewed NNSA officials.

For more information, contact John Bumgarner at BumgarnerJ@gao.gov.

Source: GAO Reports & Testimonies · 2026-10-16

What GAO Found

Under the Utilizing Space Efficiently and Improving Technologies (USE IT) Act, enacted in January 2025, federal agencies are now required to collect and report occupancy data. This data is used to calculate utilization rates for agencies’ office space in federally owned buildings and leased locations. While 20 of the 23 agencies that responded to GAO’s survey reported using existing badging systems for this purpose, 16 of these 20 agencies reported supplementing that information with data from other sources such as daily check-in surveys. Nearly all agencies surveyed noted the importance of having easy to implement, cost-effective data collection approaches that they could put in place by the act’s July 2025 implementation deadline. Most agencies reported minimal costs associated with collecting and reporting USE IT Act data—collectively $16 million across 23 agencies in 2025.

Agencies’ Use of Approaches to Collect Occupancy Data, as of September 2025

Many agencies told GAO they are either using or plan to use their USE IT Act data to identify and dispose of unneeded real property. Some agency officials told GAO that they have already made decisions to consolidate or dispose of underutilized spaces, informed in part by USE IT Act data, and that they expect to save millions of dollars annually as a result.

However, the USE IT Act data submitted to Congress and the public in March 2026 does not have important context—including on GSA-controlled vacant space—needed to fully reflect office space utilization. Without this information, Congress and the public may have an inaccurate impression of the extent to which owned and leased office spaces are being utilized, including some locations that are likely being utilized at lower or higher rates than reported.

While surveyed agencies generally agreed that USE IT Act data are helpful, about one-third expressed concerns about how GSA data collection and reporting guidelines affect their utilization rate calculations. Further, some agencies described approaches to collecting and reporting their occupancy data that are inconsistent with GSA guidelines, resulting in data that are incomplete. For example, one agency reported the number of employees that are assigned to each location rather than measuring the extent to which employees were present in those spaces. By coordinating with agencies to improve the consistency and completeness of their occupancy data, GSA could better position agencies to make informed decisions about which underused spaces to prioritize for disposal, potentially leading to tens of millions of dollars in financial savings.

Why GAO Did This Study

Chronic underutilization of federal buildings is one of the main reasons that the management of federal real property has been on GAO’s High Risk list for more than 20 years. The USE IT Act requires the 24 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act agencies to collect and report occupancy data on the number of employees working in certain owned and leased spaces. It also contains a provision for GAO to review the costs to these agencies of this requirement to measure the occupancy and utilization rates of their spaces.

This report examines 1) the approaches CFO Act agencies reported using to collect the occupancy data required by the USE IT Act and their associated costs; 2) how agencies are using USE IT Act data to inform real property decisions and what additional information, if any, may help Congress and the public better understand federal office space utilization; and 3) agencies’ concerns about USE IT Act data collection and reporting and GSA’s actions to address these concerns.

GAO surveyed the CFO Act agencies about their data collection approaches, associated costs, and any limitations to their data or selected approaches. GAO also reviewed GSA guidelines for USE IT Act data collection, analyzed GSA data on vacant spaces, and conducted in-depth interviews with five agencies selected based on the variety of approaches to collecting occupancy data and the size of their real property portfolios.

Source: GAO Reports & Testimonies · 2026-10-16