What GAO Found
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), non-traditional intelligence collectors (NTCs) are individuals whose primary profession is not intelligence collection, but who actively or passively collect sensitive U.S. information on behalf of foreign entities. For example, researchers and students at universities may act as NTCs if they collect non-public research on behalf of a foreign entity. According to the FBI, unlike intelligence officers, NTCs function independently of established intelligence organizations.
FBI officials and representatives from academic associations identified several challenges in addressing threats posed by NTCs. For example, FBI officials said that it is difficult to identify and investigate NTCs because their activities may not constitute a violation of the law until information is transferred to foreign entities. Also, there are cultural differences between the FBI and academia that may impede communication, as academic institutions promote the free exchange of information, and, according to FBI officials, may not want to be perceived as “turning over” their students.
FBI offices involved in mitigating and investigating threats posed by NTCs are the Office of Private Sector, which leads information-sharing and engagement with the private sector, and the Counterintelligence and Espionage Division. The FBI also uses the National Counterintelligence Task Force and field office-based Counterintelligence Task Forces to coordinate with partner agencies.
Interplay Between FBI’s Headquarters and Field Offices in Mitigating Threats Posed by NTCs
According to FBI officials, building relationships between field offices and academic institutions is important, so academic institutions come to the FBI for assistance in addressing NTCs. FBI officials also said they rely on tips from academia to identify potential NTCs. Publicly, FBI officials have stated that relationships with academic institutions need strengthening to address research security issues. Academic association representatives similarly have said the FBI could improve outreach efforts and that relationships between the FBI and universities are stronger at some universities than others. However, the FBI did not identify a plan for strengthening partnerships with academic institutions. Without strong partnerships, the FBI’s ability to counter NTC threats and protect U.S. research, intellectual property, and technological advantage is hindered.
Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. national security and economic interests are heavily dependent on technological innovation and advantage. According to FBI officials, NTCs pose a significant insider threat to U.S. information, intellectual property, and technological advantage.
GAO was asked to review the FBI’s efforts to investigate and address threats posed by NTCs. This report provides information on the challenges posed by NTCs, the FBI offices involved in mitigating and investigating threats posed by NTCs, and the relationships between the FBI and academic institutions relative to NTC threats, among other things.
To conduct this work, GAO reviewed laws and statutes related to the FBI’s authorities to investigate federal crimes and national security threats, analyzed documentary evidence to understand how key offices interact and coordinate with each other, and reviewed the mechanisms the FBI uses to coordinate its efforts with other federal agencies, academia, and the private sector. GAO also interviewed FBI officials and representatives from academic associations and private industry, selected based on their experiences in addressing NTC activities in academia and the private sector.
Source: GAO Reports & Testimonies · 2026-10-16