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GHSA-4hrh-34w3-5ww8: Fabio: Access-control bypass through unnormalized request paths

  • Severity: CRITICAL
  • CVE: CVE-2026-104099
  • Ecosystems: go
  • Packages: github.com/fabiolb/fabio

## Summary

Route selection uses the raw un-normalized request path, and the per-route ACL and basic-auth gates hang off that selection, so a dot-segment, encoded-dot, or double-slash variant of a protected path selects a different route, skips both gates, and is forwarded to the backend which normalizes and serves the protected resource. Unauthenticated; complete bypass of the access control the operator configured. Confirmed at HEAD b841544. Direct peers: Traefik CVE-2023-47106, Envoy CVE-2019-9901.

## The defect

fabio never normalizes the request path. A repository-wide search for path.Clean returns zero results. Route selection uses the raw path (route/table.go line 487: `if target = t.lookup(h, req.URL.Path, pick, match); target != nil {`). Both access-control gates are properties of the target that lookup returned:

“`go
// proxy/http_proxy.go
if t.AccessDeniedHTTP(r) { // line 111, per-route allow / deny:ip ACL
http.Error(w, “access denied”, http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
if !t.Authorized(r, w, p.AuthSchemes) { // line 116, per-route auth= basic auth
http.Error(w, “authorization failed”, http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
“`

and the same raw path is forwarded verbatim (`Path: r.URL.Path` at line 142). So /./admin/, /%2e/admin/, //admin/ and /x/../admin/ do not match the protected /admin route. They fall through to the catch-all / route, which carries no ACL and no auth, and fabio forwards the un-normalized path to the origin, which normalizes it and serves the…

Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-20