- Severity: HIGH
- CVE: CVE-2026-115463
- Ecosystems: composer, composer, composer
- Packages: poweradmin/poweradmin, poweradmin/poweradmin, poweradmin/poweradmin
### Summary
The email second factor is an mt_rand() six-digit code verified with no attempt limit or lockout
The email second factor is a six-digit code drawn from `mt_rand()` and verified with no attempt limit, so an attacker who already has the password can brute-force it inside its validity window.
`lib/Domain/Service/MfaService.php`, in `generateEmailVerificationCode()`:
“`php
$numericCode = mt_rand(100000, 999999);
“`
That is a 900,000-value space, and `mt_rand()` is a Mersenne Twister rather than a CSPRNG, so it is not appropriate for a security token in the first place. PHP provides `random_int()` for exactly this.
The bigger problem is that nothing limits guesses. `lib/Application/Controller/MfaVerifyController.php` calls:
“`php
$isValid = $this->mfaService->verifyCode($userId, $code);
“`
and on failure the only action taken is:
“`php
$this->logger->warning(‘[MfaVerifyController] Verification failed for user ID: {user_id}’, [‘user_id’ => $userId]);
“`
I grepped that controller for any counter, lockout, throttle or rate limit and found nothing beyond log statements. So an attacker holding valid credentials submits codes until one lands. Against 900,000 values with no ceiling on attempts, the only thing standing in the way is the code’s validity window and however fast requests can be issued.
That defeats the purpose of the second factor: it is meant to hold even when the password is known, and here it reduces to a race the attacker is likely to win wit…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-20