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GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396: install-artifact-from-github loads downloaded native artifacts without integrity verification

  • Severity: HIGH
  • CVE: CVE-2026-73864
  • Ecosystems: npm
  • Packages: install-artifact-from-github

## Description

`bin/install-from-cache.js` downloads a prebuilt native addon (`*.node`) over the network and writes it directly to the artifact path **with no cryptographic integrity verification of any kind** — no checksum manifest, no signature, no SRI. A scan of the whole package for `createHash|sha256|checksum|integrity|digest|signature` finds nothing. The file is then `require()`-loaded by the consumer, which executes the addon’s native module-init code. Anyone able to influence the download achieves code execution on the installing machine.

### Affected code (v1.6.0)

– **Mirror is fully attacker-steerable via an env var, no host pinning** — `bin/install-from-cache.js:80`:
“`js
let assetUrl = mirrorHost || process.env[mirrorEnvVar] || ‘https://github.com’;
“`
`re2` passes `–host-var RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR`, so setting `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR` (CI config, `.npmrc`/env passthrough, a compromised CI job, a poisoned shell profile) redirects 100% of the download to an arbitrary host with zero pinning.

– **The write sink is a bare `writeFile`, no verification** — `bin/install-from-cache.js:185-187`:
“`js
const write = async (name, data) => {
await fsp.mkdir(path.dirname(name), {recursive: true});
await fsp.writeFile(name, data); // `data` is the raw HTTP response body
};
“`

– **Cleartext transfer + silent protocol downgrade on redirect** — `bin/install-from-cache.js:155,165`:
“`js
const httpLib = isHttps.test(url) ? https : isHttp.test(url) ? http : null; // h…

Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-18