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GHSA-v858-xh7w-8jr5: pympp allows excessive sponsored transaction fees through padded calldata

  • Severity: MEDIUM
  • CVE: CVE-2026-63634
  • Ecosystems: pip
  • Packages: pympp

### Details
When the server acts as the fee_payer, `pympp` 0.8.0 validates calldata using `eth_abi` decoding, which is lenient about trailing bytes. The `FeePayerPolicy` caps `gas_limit` (≤ 2 M) and `max_fee_per_gas` (≤ 100 Gwei) but does **not** check calldata length.

Tempo uses legacy calldata gas pricing: **16 gas per non-zero byte**. Appending `N` bytes of `0x01` padding inflates actual gas used by `N × 16` while keeping `gas_limit` and `max_fee_per_gas` within policy caps. The server cosigns and broadcasts the padded transaction, draining its fee-payer wallet.

**Vulnerable code path:** `FeePayerPolicy` in `fee_payer_policy.py` (pympp 0.8.0) enforces `maxGas = 2_000_000` and `maxFeePerGas = 100 Gwei` but has no `calldata.length` bound. The policy check passes because the inflated gas comes from intrinsic calldata cost, not the declared `gas_limit`.

**Note:** In our experiment, we enforce an 16 KB `max_header_length`, which caps the maximum effective padding at roughly 5,500 bytes. The default padding in this PoC (5,500 bytes) is within that limit.

### PoC
The PoC is provided below. It is configured to reproduce the attack on Tempo Moderate testnet within a Docker environment. Download the PoC and run:
“`bash
unzip pympp_python_PoC.zip
cd pympp_python
docker build -t pympp-padding .
docker run –rm pympp-padding
“`
There are more details in `pympp_python/README.md`

### Impact
In our experiment, a malicious client can force the server to pay ~**5x** the normal trans…

Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-17