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GHSA-r7hw-jx6r-756g: SAML2: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-49283: unsigned embedded Response bypasses HTTP-Artifact signature verification (no embedded-Issuer binding)

  • Severity: HIGH
  • CVE: CVE-2026-110782
  • Ecosystems: composer, composer
  • Packages: simplesamlphp/saml2, simplesamlphp/saml2

## Summary
CVE-2026-49283 / GHSA-6929-8p9f-26jx (“HTTP-Artifact TLS validator confusion allows cross-IdP authentication bypass”) was fixed so that `HTTPArtifact::receive()` verifies the embedded SAML `Response` using the IdP metadata signing keys. The current implementation (master `31c72c1d`, released **v6.2.3**) reaches that verification **only when the embedded Response is signed**:

“`php
// src/Binding/HTTPArtifact.php (receive())
if (!$samlResponse->isSigned()) {
return $samlResponse; // ← unsigned embedded Response returned UNVERIFIED
}
return $this->verifyMessageSignature($samlResponse, $idpMetadata); // only runs when signed
“`

An attacker who controls one trusted-federation IdP therefore returns a **validly-signed outer `ArtifactResponse`** (signed with their own real key, which passes the mandatory outer check) that **wraps an *unsigned* “ whose “ names a *different* IdP**. `isSigned()` is false, so `verifyMessageSignature()` never runs and the forged Response is returned as successfully received. Additionally, even on the signed path `verifyMessageSignature()` verifies against the **artifact issuer’s** metadata keys but **never asserts that the embedded Response’s “ equals the artifact issuer** — the same cross-IdP confusion the CVE was assigned for is not closed by identity binding.

This is an incomplete implementation of the fix’s own stated goal (“verify signatures using IdP metadata signing keys”, commit `dac0b4b6` / #419), and a regression introduced…

Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-17