What GAO Found
To help maintain space-power superiority, the Department of Defense (DOD) relies on satellites in Earth’s orbit that provide important capabilities to the warfighter. The space industrial base and associated supply chains consist of a global network of companies that provide the hardware and software for space technologies and are critical to DOD’s ability to buy and use these satellites.
The three Space Force programs that GAO reviewed reported various supply chain risks such as challenges with manufacturing capability or capacity for some critical satellite components. Recent DOD efforts are underway to address risks more broadly across the space industrial base. These early efforts include initiating a study on supply chain risks facing proliferated constellations in low-Earth orbit and providing investments to increase manufacturing capacity.
Notional Depiction of Proliferated Satellites
Although the Space Force has taken steps to address its space industrial base risks, it has not yet fully coordinated these efforts across the national security space portfolio. For example, the Air Force issued a memorandum in April 2026 to announce an enterprise risk management service. This service is intended to provide a bird’s eye view of space supply chain risks, among other things. From that vantage point, the Space Force could use this information to support decision-making at a higher level. The memorandum, however, does not identify a lead agency or official to manage the service or clearly define roles and responsibilities—key elements supporting effective enterprise risk management and interagency collaboration. Establishing a clear leadership structure with defined roles and responsibilities would better ensure that management of this new service can effectively support decision-making—at the enterprise level—for the national space portfolio.
In April 2026, Space Systems Command created a guide to establish a process for identifying and addressing space supply chain risks across the national security space portfolio. However, the guide cannot be enforced for stakeholders outside of the Space Force, such as the National Reconnaissance Office. Establishing formal agreements could strengthen stakeholder participation, enhance accountability, and help ensure that all risks are identified and managed as this space portfolio grows and continues to strain the supply chain.
Why GAO Did This Study
DOD’s shift to constellations of smaller satellites in greater numbers, along with a similar shift in the private sector, is straining the space industrial base and its supply chain. This strain poses a risk to the Space Force’s—organized under the Department of the Air Force—ability to procure the necessary technologies it plans to use to carry out future missions. The space industrial base is a subset of DOD’s broader defense industrial base, which GAO monitors as part of its High Risk Series.
A Senate report includes a provision for GAO to assess the military space industrial base and supply chains. GAO’s report addresses (1) the supply chain risks that programs and DOD identified and the efforts to address these risks, and (2) the extent to which DOD has coordinated its approach to addressing supply chain risks.
GAO reviewed program risk documentation and interviewed DOD officials. GAO also compared recent Space Force enterprise risk management efforts to GAO’s essential elements for enterprise risk management and GAO’s leading practices for enhanced interagency collaboration.
Source: GAO Reports & Testimonies · 2026-11-17