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GHSA-w553-pwx6-3mg9: lightsaml allows Signature wrapping bypass

  • Severity: HIGH
  • CVE: CVE-2026-63182
  • Ecosystems: composer, composer
  • Packages: litesaml/lightsaml, litesaml/lightsaml

### Summary

LightSaml 5.0.0 (latest release; also confirmed on 4.6.1) validates an inbound `samlp:Response` by collecting its direct-child `saml:Assertion` elements and validating each one’s `ds:Signature` via robrichards/xmlseclibs. The two layers disagree on which element a signature actually covers: LightSaml reads claims from the assertion node it collected, while xmlseclibs resolves the signed `Reference URI=”#id”` with a document-wide `//*[@Id]` XPath that returns the first ID-bearing element anywhere in the document.

An attacker who has captured one genuine signed assertion can exploit this to surface attacker-authored, unsigned claims.

### Details

`Response::deserialize` collects assertions with `manyElementsFromXml`, whose relative XPath `saml:Assertion` matches only direct children of the `Response`. Each collected assertion is validated independently by `AssertionSignatureValidatorAction` against the out-of-band trusted IdP credential (resolved by Issuer entityId, never from the document):

https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/Protocol/Response.php#L122
https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/AbstractSamlModel.php#L93
https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Action/Assertion/Inbound/AssertionSignatureValidatorAction.php#L28

The check delegates to xmlseclibs `XMLSecurityDSig::validateReference()`, which first removes the signature node being validated from the shared document (enveloped-signature removal):

`…

Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-16