- Severity: MEDIUM
- CVE: CVE-2026-129235
- Ecosystems: go
- Packages: github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark
**Ecosystem / package:** Go — `github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark` (the `kubeshark`
CLI, `kubeshark mcp` subcommand)
**Affected component:** `cmd/mcpRunner.go`, MCP tool `download_file`
**Affected versions:** `>= v53.1.0`, `< v53.4.0` (the flaw shipped with the
tool’s first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release)
**Patched version:** `v53.4.0`
**Credit:** novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.
## Summary
The `download_file` MCP tool fetches a caller-supplied `path` from the Kubeshark
Hub API and writes the response body to a caller-supplied `dest` on the local
filesystem with no validation of `dest`. An attacker who can influence the MCP
tool arguments — e.g. via indirect prompt injection against an AI agent driving
`kubeshark mcp` — can write attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary path
writable by the user running the MCP server (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`,
`~/.kube/config`, `~/.bashrc`), and can request arbitrary Hub API endpoints.
`download_file` is registered unconditionally (available in the default,
non-`–allow-destructive` posture).
## Introduced in
Commit `eb7dc42b` — “Add get_file_url and download_file MCP tools (#1853)”,
2026-03-04 — first released in **v53.1.0** (`v53.1.0~1`). An earlier attempt
(`dbfd17d9`) was reverted (`a46f05c4`) before any release, so no tag before
v53.1.0 is affected.
## Details
In `callDownloadFile` (`cmd/mcpRunner.go`), both `path` and `dest` come straight
from the tool arguments:
– `dest` was passed directly to…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-16