- Severity: MEDIUM
- CVE: CVE-2026-129301
- Ecosystems: pip
- Packages: mail-parser
### Impact
`write_attachments()` called `_safe_attachment_filename()` and `write_sample()` inside its loop
with no guard, so a single crafted attachment raised out of the whole save. Every attachment
**after** the malicious one was silently never written, with no error surfaced to a caller that
catches only `MailParserError`.
That is an evasion primitive as much as an availability bug: a sender puts one poisoned part
first and the real payload second, and the payload never reaches the extraction directory that
a downstream scanner or sandbox reads — while it still reaches the recipient’s mail client
intact. The tool’s output diverges from the bytes actually in the message, which is the same
failure mode as the filename-sanitizing bypass in
[GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496](https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496).
Three shapes were reachable, all from attacker-controlled MIME metadata:
– **NUL smuggled through RFC 2231** — `filename*=us-ascii”evil%00.bin` decodes to a NUL in the
filename during parsing and raised `ValueError` out of the name check;
– **overlong basename** — a filename longer than `NAME_MAX` (e.g. 300 characters) raised
`OSError: File name too long` from `open()`, *after* creating a zero-byte stub on disk;
– **undecodable payload** — a body that is not valid base64 raised `binascii.Error` (a
`ValueError` subclass) from the decode performed inside the `open()` block.
“`python
import tempfile, mailparser
raw = (“Content-Ty…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-16