- Severity: MEDIUM
- CVE: CVE-2026-129237
- Ecosystems: go
- Packages: go.qbee.io/agent
## Summary
`qbee-agent` contains a Zip Slip vulnerability in `app/utils/tar.go`. The tar extractor checks whether an entry remains inside the destination directory with:
“`go
strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean)
“`
This does not enforce a path separator boundary. If the destination directory is `/tmp/…/context`, a tar entry such as `../context-outside/payload.txt` cleans to `/tmp/…/context-outside/payload.txt` and still passes the prefix check. qbee-agent then creates the outside directory and writes the payload outside the intended extraction root.
The issue is reachable through the Docker Compose build context path when `UseContext` is enabled.
## Details
Code references below were verified against `qbee-io/qbee-agent` commit:
– `1d8bdbb7422adb4ca563d3114cbe2817d6ba3581`
Affected repository:
– `qbee-io/qbee-agent`
Affected files:
– `app/utils/tar.go`
– Docker Compose context path in `app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.go`
The vulnerable extraction code:
– `app/utils/tar.go:89-93`
“`go
targetPath := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(destPath, header.Name))
destdirClean := filepath.Clean(destPath)
if !strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean) {
return fmt.Errorf(“tar entry %s is outside of destination directory %s”, targetPath, destdirClean)
}
“`
The file is then created at the accepted `targetPath`:
– `app/utils/tar.go:96-109`
“`go
case tar.TypeDir:
if err := os.MkdirAll(targetPath, 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
case tar.TypeReg:
t…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-16