- Severity: MEDIUM
- CVE: CVE-2026-128071
- Ecosystems: npm, npm, npm, npm, npm
- Packages: nuxt, nuxt, @nuxt/nitro-server, @nuxt/nitro-server, @nuxt/vite-server
### Summary
Nuxt matches route rules against the request path with encoded slashes (`%2F`) left encoded, while the page router decodes them into route params. A request that spells a slash as `%2F` can therefore render a page through a catch-all route without the route rules configured for the path it resolves to. The fix for [GHSA-6gq8-jgmh-3ffp](https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-6gq8-jgmh-3ffp) deliberately left reserved escapes such as `%2F` encoded, so it did not cover this form.
### Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can bypass route rules that protect paths served by a catch-all page route, or by a custom route whose param can span several segments.
“`ts
export default defineNuxtConfig({
routeRules: {
‘/docs/internal/**’: { appMiddleware: ‘auth’, headers: { ‘X-Frame-Options’: ‘DENY’ } },
‘/admin/**’: { redirect: ‘/login’ },
},
})
“`
With `app/pages/docs/[…slug].vue`, `/docs/internal/guide` runs `auth`, but `/docs/internal%2Fguide` renders the same page without running `auth` and without the header. With a root `app/pages/[…slug].vue`, `/admin%2Fsecret` is rendered instead of redirected.
The rules skipped include server-side `redirect`, `headers`, `proxy`, `ssr` and `noScripts`, and `appMiddleware`, `appLayout` and `redirect` as matched in the app during server rendering and client navigation. `getRouteRules` returns the same incomplete result.
Whether the page then shows protected content depends on how it reads the route:
– With a…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-16