- Severity: LOW
- CVE: CVE-2026-128076
- Ecosystems: npm, npm, npm, npm
- Packages: nuxt, nuxt, @nuxt/nitro-server, @nuxt/nitro-server
### Summary
The fix for CVE-2026-46342 (GHSA-g8wj-3cr3-6w7v) binds each `/__nuxt_island/_.json` path to its props by hashing the `(name, props, context, source)` tuple. That hash was computed over `ohash`’s serialization, which does not escape quotes inside strings or delimiters inside keys, so two different prop objects can produce the same hash. A request with crafted props can therefore pass validation for another island’s path and render different content at that path.
### Impact
For example, these two prop objects serialize identically and share one island path:
“`js
{ html: ”, note: ” }
{ html: ‘\’,note:\” }
“`
This reopens the scenarios described in GHSA-g8wj-3cr3-6w7v:
– **`nuxt generate` / prerendering.** Nuxt caches prerendered island responses by path. If the crawler reaches a link to the colliding URL (for example in user-submitted content included in the build) before it renders the page that uses the legitimate props, the colliding response is written into the generated page.
– **Path-keyed shared caches.** A CDN or reverse proxy that caches `/__nuxt_island/*` by path only, ignoring the query, can be primed with the colliding response.
An attacker has to construct props that collide with a specific legitimate tuple, which in practice means at least part of that tuple is a string they control (for example a stored comment or profile field passed as a prop). Where a prop reaches an unsafe HTML sink in the island (`v-html`, `innerHTML`, a renderer treat…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-16