- Severity: LOW
- CVE: CVE-2026-128087
- Ecosystems: rust
- Packages: russh
### Summary
A malicious SSH server whose host key is rejected can still cause russh’s `client::Handler::kex_done()` callback to execute with the raw key-exchange shared secret. Applications using the callback for its documented protocol-bridging purpose may derive keys, initialize a secondary data channel, or perform another externally visible action before russh calls `check_server_key()` and rejects the server.
### Details
During the initial key exchange, russh calls `kex_done()` immediately after the server proves possession of the presented host key, but before the application decides whether that key belongs to the intended server:
“`rust
let shared_secret = newkeys.kex.shared_secret_bytes();
handler
.kex_done(shared_secret, &newkeys.names, session)
.await?;
// Initial KEX only checks trust afterwards.
if let Some(certificate) = server_host_certificate {
if !handler.check_server_key(&certificate.into()).await? {
return Err(crate::Error::UnknownKey.into());
}
} else if let Some(server_host_key) = server_host_key {
let check = handler.check_server_key(&server_host_key.into()).await?;
if !check {
return Err(crate::Error::UnknownKey.into());
}
}
“`
This is in `russh/src/client/mod.rs` at lines 2036-2078 of commit `183a22e8f8f490fa09b6eb7bd044ef99d8c4414f`.
The API documentation describes `check_server_key()` as the important trust decision that prevents man-in-the-middle attacks. It describes `kex_done()` as the callback for deriving keys for secondary encr…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-13