- Severity: HIGH
- CVE: CVE-2026-76088
- Ecosystems: maven, maven
- Packages: org.pgpainless:pgpainless-core, org.pgpainless:pgpainless-core
### Summary
An architectural security boundary bypass in inline-detach and MessageInspector allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to force unbounded recursive decompression routines. By supplying a specially crafted OpenPGP message containing deeply nested compressed packet structures, an attacker can completely bypass the library’s built-in DoS protections (MAX_LAYER_DEPTH = 16), leading to resource exhaustion, thread blocking, and potential Out-of-Memory (OOM) application crashes.
### Details
The pg-painless core processing pipeline implements a defensive threshold constraint to prevent decompression bomb sequences (Zip Bombs) and arbitrary resource consumption:
Enforcement Location: pgpainless-main/pgpainless-core/src/main/kotlin/org/pgpainless/decryption_verification/MessageMetadata.kt
Threshold Constant: MAX_LAYER_DEPTH = 16
However, a code architecture review revealed two specific packet-walking implementations that unpack and step through PGPCompressedData packets manually, entirely failing to track or increment a layer depth index counter against the static compliance limits:
In InlineDetachImpl.kt (Line ~78-93): The logic loops over data packets via compressedData.dataStream. Because it processes the incoming data block-by-block without leveraging or passing constraints down to the guarded OpenPgpMessageInputStream tracking mechanism, it accepts infinite nesting.
In MessageInspector.kt (Line ~95): The inspector utility descends recursively down nested co…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-19