- Severity: HIGH
- CVE: CVE-2026-71861
- Ecosystems: go
- Packages: chainguard.dev/sdk
### Summary
The `auth/aws` package of the `chainguard.dev/sdk` Go library provides Chainguard’s AWS-backed identity federation (an AWS workload proves its identity to Chainguard by signing an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request). Its verifier, `VerifyToken`, reads the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` binding headers from a presented token but does not require them to be covered by the SigV4 signature. AWS STS validates only the headers listed in `SignedHeaders` and ignores all others, so an attacker can take a `GetCallerIdentity` request that a victim signed for a *different* relying party, inject or rewrite those two headers *after* signing (without invalidating the signature), and replay it to any service that authenticates callers with `VerifyToken`. The binding those headers were meant to provide is therefore forgeable — a verifier-side (relying-party) authentication bypass / cross-service token replay.
### Background
The package uses the standard “signed `GetCallerIdentity`” pattern — the same approach HashiCorp Vault’s AWS auth method and Kubernetes `aws-iam-authenticator` use: the caller signs an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request with its AWS credentials to prove who it is, and presents that signed request as a bearer token. It has two halves:
– `GenerateToken` (client): builds the `GetCallerIdentity` request, adds the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` headers that bind the proof to a specific Chainguard audience (issuer) and assumabl…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-18