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GHSA-8vf2-hxg5-crqh: Kubeshark: MCP `start_kubeshark` argument injection via `pod_regex` → image redirect → cluster takeover

  • Severity: HIGH
  • CVE: CVE-2026-129236
  • Ecosystems: go
  • Packages: github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark

**Ecosystem / package:** Go — `github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark` (the `kubeshark`
CLI, `kubeshark mcp` subcommand)
**Affected component:** `cmd/mcpRunner.go`, MCP tool `start_kubeshark`
**Affected versions:** `>= v53.1.0`, `< v53.4.0` (the flaw shipped with the MCP
command’s first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release)
**Patched version:** `v53.4.0`
**Credit:** novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.

## Summary
The `start_kubeshark` MCP tool builds a `kubeshark tap` command by appending the
caller-supplied `pod_regex` as a bare positional argument, with no `–`
end-of-options separator. Because `tap` is a cobra command, a `pod_regex` that
begins with `-`/`–set=` is parsed as a **flag**, not as the pod regex. An
attacker who can influence the tool arguments (e.g. indirect prompt injection
against an agent driving `kubeshark mcp –allow-destructive`) can inject
arbitrary `–set` Helm value overrides — notably `tap.docker.registry` /
`tap.docker.tag` — redirecting the deployed worker/hub/front images to an
attacker-controlled registry. The worker DaemonSet runs privileged with
`hostNetwork` and the host filesystem mounted, so an attacker image yields node
and cluster-admin compromise.

## Introduced in
Commit `0bbbb473` — “[1] Add MCP (Model Context Protocol) server command
(#1832)”, 2026-02-06 — first released in **v53.1.0** (`v53.1.0~23`). The
`pod_regex` argument has been appended as a bare positional since the tool’s
introduction; there is no regressio…

Source: GitHub Security Advisories · 2026-11-16